



OPTIMIZING THE INDONESIAN COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY THROUGH THE CENTER FOR TERRORISM ANALYSIS AND CRISIS CONTROL

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Abstrak

Penurunan jumlah serangan teroris dan melemahnya jaringan teroris internasional dalam lima tahun terakhir belum seluruhnya menghilangkan ancaman terorisme di Indonesia. Potensi ancaman tetap tinggi karena faktor-faktor seperti penggunaan teknologi untuk rekrutmen dan radikalisasi secara online, keterlibatan perempuan dan remaja, serta kerentanan situasi politik domestik. Penelitian dengan metodologi kualitatif ini dilakukan untuk membahas strategi Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) dalam memenuhi perannya sebagai Pusat Analisis dan Pengendalian Krisis yang diakibatkan Terorisme sebagaimana diamanatkan oleh Undang-Undang No. 5 Tahun 2018. Kesimpulan diambil dari data yang diperoleh melalui diskusi kelompok terpumpun dengan para pembuat kebijakan, tinjauan pustaka, serta analisis kebijakan dan strategi kontraterorisme dari Indonesia dan negara lain sebagai referensi. Temuan penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa fungsi BNPT sebagai pusat analisis dan pengendalian krisis yang diakibatkan terorisme perlu dioptimalkan melalui regulasi yang dapat memperkuat perannya dan mendorong komunikasi serta koordinasi yang efektif antara BNPT dengan pemangku kepentingan terkait.

Kata Kunci: BNPT; pengendalian krisis; Pusdalsis; strategi kontraterorism; terorisme

Abstract

The decline in terrorist attacks and the weakening of the international terrorist network over the past five years have yet eliminated the threat of terrorism in Indonesia. Potential threats remain high due to the use of technology for online recruitment and radicalization, the involvement of women and adolescents, and domestic political vulnerabilities. This qualitative study examines the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) 's strategy in fulfilling its role as the Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control, as mandated by Law No. 5 of 2018. This study draws its conclusion from data collected through focus group discussions with policymakers, reviewing relevant literature, and analyzing counterterrorism policies and strategies from Indonesia and other countries. The study recommends optimizing the BNPT's function as a center for terrorism analysis and crisis management by formulating regulations reinforcing its role and promoting communication and coordination between stakeholders.

Keywords: BNPT; counterterrorism; strategy crisis control; Pusdalsis; terrorism

Introduction

The number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia has decreased over the last five years, partly due to the weakening of the international terrorist network, the Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Christiastuti, 2023). While the Indonesian government has been successful in preventing terrorism and achieving a “zero terrorist attack” in 2023, it’s important to note that Indonesia remains at risk of terrorism. The potential threat has increased due to the use of technology, which makes it easier for terrorist groups to recruit members, spread ideologies, and raise funds online (Ghifari, 2017). Further, the presence of various terrorism affiliates in Indonesia, including lone wolves, and the growing involvement of women, adolescents, and children in terrorism networks call for a comprehensive strategy (BNPT, 2022).

To address the issue of terrorism in Indonesia, which has been increasing since the late 1990s, the Indonesian government established the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) through Presidential Decree No. 46 of 2010. This regulation gives BNPT significant authority to implement various strategies to counter terrorism, including prevention, protection, deradicalization, law enforcement, and national preparedness. The primary responsibilities, functions, and authorities of BNPT represent a significant shift in the Indonesian government’s approach to addressing terrorism, prioritizing a soft approach through law enforcement and human rights protection during the reform era.

Under this Presidential Decree, BNPT is also mandated to formulate and implement national policies, strategies, and programs for counterterrorism. In doing so, and as regulated in Law No. 5 of 2018 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, BNPT must coordinate with other relevant stakeholders, including TNI and Polri, to promote national preparedness and carry out deradicalization programs. Further, Article 43E paragraph 2 also specifically designates BNPT as the Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control or *Pusat Analisis dan Pengendalian Krisis*, also known as Pusdalsis. As a center for terrorism analysis and crisis control, the former Chief of BNPT, Rycko Amelzsa Dahniel, has highlighted the role of BNPT to serve as a data collection and information processing center, enabling it to effectively support the President in crisis control during terrorist incidents (BNPT, 2024).

Looking at the current and potential terrorism threat, the Indonesian government must adopt a more proactive stance in exercising its role as a center for terrorism analysis

and crisis control due to terrorism. In contrast to the United States and United Kingdom governments - which have published regular reports and studies on the terrorist threat level for authorized stakeholders, some of which were also publicly available, in response to the domestic and international terrorist attacks - the Indonesian government has yet issued an assessment of the terrorist threat level, nor established any procedures for controlling crisis due to terrorism from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis stage, involving other relevant stakeholders.

Therefore, this study questions and examines BNPT's preparedness to operate effectively as Indonesia's Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control (Pusdalsis) as outlined in Law No. 5 of 2018, Article 43E. According to the law, BNPT is crucial in supporting the President in formulating policies and strategies by exercising its role in analysis and crisis control, including resource deployment. Therefore, this research highlights the need for improvements in communication and coordination to enable BNPT to fulfill its role. The discussion of Pusdalsis' role will also look at best practices and experiences from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, and Malaysia in assessing the threat level and controlling crises due to terrorism in their countries.

Literature Review

Some literature on Indonesia's counterterrorism strategy explains that the Indonesian government has made significant progress in capturing suspected terrorists, thwarting terrorist acts, and disrupting financial support for terrorist activities. Nevertheless, the country lacks regular analysis of terrorism trends and threat levels, as well as crisis control due to terrorism. According to Johnson in his study "The Longue Duree: Indonesia's Response to the Threat of Jihadist Terrorism 1998-2016," the counterterrorism policy implemented by the Indonesian government is only effective for a limited time (Johnson, 2016). For terrorist organizations to be effective, they must be able to adapt to the policies in place.

Johnson (2016) notes that competition between government agencies leads to poor coordination and cooperation in prevention strategies. Johnson criticizes the Indonesian government's failure to address both violent and non-violent organizations effectively. These failures include the community organizations blending in with society and the

military's (TNI) involvement in countering terrorism in Indonesia, presenting distinct challenges and signaling a lack of confidence in the police's counterterrorism strategy (Johnson, 2016).

Regarding the Indonesian police and military involvement in counterterrorism, Prasetyo (2016) confirms their crucial role in ensuring security and stability (Prasetyo, 2016). He concludes that the Indonesian Armed Forces has adopted a new counterterrorism strategy from its military operations other than war. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government currently prioritizes a soft approach to counterterrorism, considering it a more suitable method due to the various factors driving terrorism in the country, such as ideology, economic conditions, politics, and culture. Those approaches lead to the underutilization of hard approaches regarding security policy.

Although Prasetyo acknowledges the effective implementation of the deradicalization program as a soft approach to counter radical ideologies, he underscores the importance of coordinating the TNI and the National Police (Polri) to carry out a more organized and structured deradicalization program. He finds that the proactive initiative focuses on neutralizing radical influences conducted without significant involvement of the TNI. Therefore, he confirms that the collaboration between the Indonesian military and police should involve early warning, early detection, prevention, and deterrence of terrorism in Indonesia. Other challenges related to counterterrorism strategies in Indonesia include the development of terrorist organizations (Chew, 2023), the demographic conditions of Indonesian society (Kustana, 2017), and the involvement of women and children in terrorism (Qori'ah, 2019).

In Indonesia, however, the threat of terrorism has not yet been completely eradicated. Previous studies also perform at least nine challenges the Indonesian government faces in counterterrorism. First, despite the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria and the deaths of its leaders since the end of 2018 (Christiastuti, 2023), terrorist groups in Indonesia continue to engage in activities of internal consolidation, recruitment, ideological propaganda, and fundraising. Most of their activities are conducted online and on social media (Ghifari, 2017), particularly amidst the global pandemic. Although in the past two years, some leaders and members of Jemaah Islamiyah have pledged to support and be loyal to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, their loyalty remains questioned.

Second, there was a political shift in Afghanistan when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan after the former President fled in August 2021. Their return to power has raised concerns domestically and internationally due to their history of implementing strict Islamic rule and close relations with Al Qaeda (Maizland, 2023). Despite commitments made under a peace deal with the US (Brown, 2021), some world leaders remain apprehensive as there is no guarantee that Al Qaeda will not be active in other countries, including Indonesia. Such developments pose a challenge, as the Taliban's rise provides motivation to AQ supporters and affiliations in Indonesia and enhances their standing.

Third, the increased use of the internet and social media by terrorist groups for propaganda, recruitment, and fundraising, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic. There has been a 101% increase in suspicious financial transactions suspected to be linked to the financing of terrorist activities during this time (BNPT, 2021). Moreover, the widespread use of the internet and social media by Indonesians, particularly young people, has increased their vulnerability to radicalism (Kominfo, 2015). Fourth, some studies are also concerned about the method of collecting terrorism funds in Indonesia, which has evolved with the increasing use of the internet and social media, formal and informal remittance services, online loans, and donations from non-profit organizations (Jusi et al., 2020; Laksmi, 2019; Yunanto et al., 2023).

Fifth, BNPT recorded that 1,403 Indonesian citizens joined Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) in Iraq and Syria, with 128 killed, 174 returning, 556 deported, and 545 still active in conflict zones. Among those in the conflict zone are 224 adult males, 183 females, and 138 children. Additionally, 37 Indonesians affiliated with terrorist groups in Mindanao and 21 in BNPT Afghanistan (Suptohutomo, 2022). The international pressure for the FTF deportation and returnees presents challenges for the Indonesian government, including developing programs to address radical mindsets and determining the legal status of those involved in crimes abroad (Rachma et al., 2022).

Sixth, the increased involvement of women, teenagers, and children in terrorism since 2015. Women, teens, and children have not just provided support but now actively participated in terrorist activities. As confirmed by the former Head of BNPT, 18 young women were identified as terrorists in 2022 (BNPT, 2022). Nevertheless, to date, the Indonesian government still considers women, teens, and children as victims of radical

terrorism propaganda spread through online and social media platforms (BNPT, 2022; Sukabdi, 2015; Widodo et al., 2022).

Seventh, there is diversity in motives and patterns of terrorist attacks. Previously, the Indonesian government divided the anatomy of radical and terrorist groups into three types: militant radical groups, separatist radical groups, and radical terrorist groups (Damayanti et al., 2013). In the last decade, there have also been “lone wolves” to define terrorist who conduct their attacks alone, such as Zakiah Aini, who attacked the National Police Headquarters in 2021 (Tatara & Retnaningsih, 2022). There are also “wolf packs” when some “lone wolves” unite. With the return of the FTF, it is most likely that the anatomy of terrorism in Indonesia will develop, as well as its motives and patterns of action.

Eighth, the rise of recidivism. Based on BNPT data, as of 2022, there were 1,036 former terrorist inmates. However, not all of them participated in the government’s deradicalization program. Of that number, 116 ex-prisoners became recidivists, with 19 rearrested (BNPT, 2023). The recurrence of terrorism-related offenses among former inmates raises serious concerns about the implementation of the deradicalization program and the coordination among relevant stakeholders (Sukabdi, 2015). Lastly, there are presidential and simultaneous regional head elections. Some researchers have highlighted that general elections at both national and regional levels have the potential to generate tension and conflict, which may fuel acts of terrorism (Peri, Rees, Smith, 2020; Bali, 2007). Recent developments also suggest a shift in radical terrorist groups’ strategy from “bullets” to “ballots” approach or from employing violence to seeking influence through democratic processes, emphasizing the need for increased vigilance (Victoria, 2024).

From the above studies, we might appreciate the measures undertaken by BNPT in prevention, protection, deradicalization, and law enforcement. However, there is a lack of studies on BNPT’s role as the Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control. This study primarily analyzes Indonesia’s counterterrorism policy by examining the best practices of other countries’ Centers for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The disparities, such as the threats of terrorism and variations in government systems and governance, imply that each country, including Indonesia, has distinct policies and strategies.

To deeply understand the functionality of the Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control, this study utilized a qualitative methodology involving focus group discussion and policy analysis. Such a method helps researchers gain a deeper understanding of the behaviors of actors in social life. Qualitative research methods are valuable for their exploratory and descriptive nature. This method enables the authors to interpret social behaviors using primary and secondary data analysis (Blaikie, 2010; Bradbury-Jones et al., 2017; Irvine, 2023).

The authors use focus group discussions to collect information from relevant informants and stakeholders in counterterrorism policymaking. Focus groups involve a deliberately selected group of individuals and effectively convene people with similar backgrounds to discuss a specific topic of interest (Nyumba et al., 2018). The moderator leads the participants, introducing topics for discussion and fostering a lively exchange among the group (Mishra, 2016). Ritchie and Lewis, as cited in Basnet (2018), highlight the valuable social context provided by focus groups for experiencing a phenomenon. They emphasize how the context can influence people's perspectives and illustrate how conversing with others generates important data (Basnet, 2018).

Additionally, policy analysis evaluates alternative government policies and programs addressing social and economic issues (Patton et al., 2016). Policy analysis is an essential tool for understanding the motivations behind government policies and their real-world impacts. It empowers researchers to gain deep insights into how research evidence shapes policymaking and to grasp the underlying values, interests, and political contexts guiding policy decisions. These methods are instrumental in advocating for more effective policies to bolster counterterrorism efforts (Browne et al., 2019).

This study collected both primary and secondary qualitative data. The research team obtained primary data through focus group discussions, while secondary data came from a literature review and analysis of counterterrorism policies in the US, UK, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The authors rigorously triangulated primary and secondary data sources to analyze all the findings. For this reason, the authors sorted, grouped, and evaluated the various data obtained, both from the source and the substance of the data.

Results and Discussion

The comprehensive analysis and threat assessments unequivocally assert that the potential threat of terrorism is still high in various countries, including Indonesia. While there has been a decrease in the number of terrorist acts in Indonesia over the past five years, as acknowledged by BNPT (2023) in its “Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outlook,” this does not imply the eradication of terrorism in the country (BNPT, 2023). On the contrary, the continual evolution of terrorism networks and the propagation of radicalism and terrorism ideology facilitated by social media underscore the persistent and potent threat. Therefore, enhanced measures, such as regular analysis and continuous controlling and monitoring of terrorism, are imperative to identify and address potential threats effectively.

This study focuses on the mandate of Law No. 5 of 2018, particularly Article 43E paragraph 2, which designates BNPT as a Center for Analysis and Crisis Control due to terrorism (Pusdalsis). Such a center is crucial for the President to effectively establish policies and measures to address crises. It’s essential to understand that terrorism crisis control strategies are distinct from crisis management. Crisis management is a direct response to changes that threaten a situation, specifically within the context of terrorism. In other words, crisis management focuses on stakeholder responses, decision-making during crises, and monitoring crisis development. The overarching objective of crisis management is to minimize losses resulting from the crisis (Iriantara, 2004; Kriyantono, 2015).

On the other hand, crisis control involves responding to a crisis or threat, evaluating the implemented programs, and monitoring potential threats continuously. According to the Great Dictionary of the Indonesian Language (KBBI), “control” has two meanings. First, it denotes actively restraining or limiting specific actions. Second, it involves supervising progress by regularly comparing results with targets and adjusting efforts based on the evaluation. The study by Fitri et al. (2024) highlights the significance of a management control system as a valuable tool for assessing performance at different organizational levels. Their use of the Levers of Control framework, introduced by Simons in 1995, underscores the importance of belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactive control systems.

Further, Maciariello & Kirby (1994) classify control systems as an integral management part. It is a series of interconnected communication structures that facilitate information management. Such frameworks enable managers to coordinate different organizational units and maintain consistent progress toward achieving organizational objectives. Hence, crisis control in the context of terrorism extends beyond crisis management and encompasses the response to terrorism threats and the supervision of crisis management. This crisis control also involves regularly comparing results and targets and making continuous adjustments or developments based on monitoring existing and potential threats (Maciariello & Kirby, 1994).

Best Practices in Other Countries

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US transformed its approach to combating terrorism. In 2003, the government established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to oversee national security efforts, including countering terrorist threats. This shift also redirected focus away from domestic right-wing extremist groups and toward international threats posed by religious-based networks such as Al Qaeda and ISIS (Gallaher, 2015: 318-319).

During Trump's presidency, the US government issued the National Security Strategy (2017) and National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2018) documents, clearly outlining its efforts to address terrorist attacks rooted in radical Islamic ideology. The US counterterrorism focus shifted during the Joe Biden administration, with the "National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism" in 2021, which places greater emphasis on addressing threats from domestic terrorism targeting minorities and anti-government groups. Despite variations in focus, both documents share a consistent strategy: (1) preventing the recruitment and mobilization of violence and (2) preventing and counteracting terrorist activities.

Regarding controlling the crisis due to terrorism, in 2004, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued comprehensive rules of law to respond through the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) takes the lead in investigating and preventing acts of terrorism at the federal level, with robust support from the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Should an incident exceed the FBI's capacity, the DHS Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, has the authority to declare it an Incident of National Significance. Such a declaration prompts the establishment of a Joint Field Office (JFO) to ensure seamless coordination among the involved departments.

Even though the FBI significantly prevents terrorism, the US government established the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003. The NCTC is primarily responsible for gathering information from various existing counterterrorism units, analyzing and integrating the collected data, and then sharing it with relevant stakeholders. As the central agency for sharing information, maintaining watch lists, and providing situational awareness for all US government agencies, the NCTC has unparalleled access to information from domestic and foreign terrorism cases.

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) provides critical analysis used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to inform the public about the potential threat of terrorist attacks. Based on this analysis, DHS issues the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), which categorizes the risk of terrorist attacks into five levels:

- 1) Low (Green),
- 2) Guarded (Blue),
- 3) Elevated (Yellow),
- 4) High (Orange), and
- 5) Severe (Red).

These levels are determined based on the severity of the threat and potential impact, providing crucial information for the public and authorities.

Figure 1. The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) Classification



Source: (US Homeland Security, 2008)

In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security replaced the HSAS information model with the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), citing its unresponsiveness and failure to provide timely and relevant information about the nature of attacks and planning to the public and private sectors. Additionally, the system built by HSAS failed to instill trust among various parties. Some governors and mayors often hesitate to enhance security conditions in their areas following the HSAS level or implement policies recommended by the Department of Homeland Security (Shapiro & Cohen, 2007).

The current National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) warning model provides two threat indications: elevated and imminent. The distinction between the two reflects how credible and accurate the information is regarding the possibility of a terrorist attack. Authorities issue an elevated indicator when the available information is general. The status is raised to imminent when the information received is credible and complete, including details about the form and timing of the attack.

Similar to the US, the British government has a rich history of addressing terrorist attacks, including those from Irish separatist groups dating back to the late 1960s (McGarry, 2021). Additionally, in the 1990s, they also faced right-wing groups that targeted minority groups. In the early 2000s, domestic extremist groups in the UK, inspired by global jihadist ideology, significantly shifted the sources and nature of terrorism by spreading radical ideologies and recruiting vulnerable individuals (Croft & Moore, 2010).

Following the bombing of the London transport system in July 2005, the UK government implemented the United Kingdom Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CONTEST). This strategy has undergone five revisions: 2003, 2009, 2011, 2018, and 2023. Different governments with varying party coalitions and Prime Ministers have publicized each revision. Consequently, shifting threat perceptions and evolving terrorism dynamics may prompt policy differences, even when developed under the same political party.

The UK CONTEST in 2011 and 2018 both shared a similar perception of the terrorism threat, mainly arising from radical Islam and global jihadism. In CONTEST 2018, the UK government began to acknowledge the Daesh group or Islamic State (IS) as a significant threat alongside Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. A series of ISIS-led attacks,

such as the 2016 Manchester bombing and the 2015 Paris attacks, prompted this recognition. Looking ahead to the UK CONTEST 2023, the British government extended its assessment of threats to include not only radical Islamic terrorist groups from abroad but also domestic terrorist groups. The government also recognized that technological advancements, especially the use of online media for propagating radical ideology, have the potential to pose a threat.

Although developed by different Prime Ministers, the UK CONTEST strategies of 2011, 2018, and 2023 share similarities, especially in the four pillars of the prevention strategy: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. The “Prevent” pillar focuses on preventing radicalization and thwarting acts of terrorism. The “Pursue” pillar aims to prevent domestic and international terrorism attacks. The “Protect” pillar strengthens efforts to shield against terrorism domestically and internationally. Lastly, the “Prepare” pillar focuses on lessening the impact of terrorist attacks (Home Office, 2018).

Apart from formulating a clear strategy for the UK CONTEST, the UK government has also established a terrorism analysis and crisis control center managed by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). This agency is central to the UK’s counterterrorism system, prioritizing counterterrorism resources by setting national threat levels, informing safeguards and preparedness measures, and providing analysis to support the UK government’s counterterrorism efforts. Housed within MI5, JTAC operates under the authority of the Director General of MI5. Although based within MI5, JTAC operates independently and includes representatives from 16 departments and agencies (Security Service MI5, 2023).

JTAC analysts base their assessments on intelligence data, terrorist capabilities, intentions, and the likelihood of an attack within a specific timeframe. JTAC compiles periodic analyses regarding potential threats and categorizes threat levels into five levels: (1) Low, (2) Moderate, (3) Substantial, (4) Severe, and (5) Critical. Understanding the threat level is crucial for determining policies to control terrorism crises. JTAC also issues threat warnings and reports on trends, terrorist networks, and capabilities in the UK area (House of Commons, 2009).

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is crucial as the first responder in terrorism crisis control, particularly in London. To combat the latest terrorism threat, the UK government established the National Digital Exploitation Service (NDES) to prevent

terrorism from using digital technology. The NDES works in collaboration with MI5 and police forces across the UK. Additionally, to enhance police capabilities, the British government enacted the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which enables police to request search warrants and carry out emergency arrests (Home Office & The Rt Hon Tom Tugendhat MBE VR, 2022).

In contrast to the US and UK, Malaysia and the Philippines have not consistently compiled and issued policy documents analyzing the level of threats in their countries. Nevertheless, the Malaysian government has bolstered its counterterrorism measures by strengthening laws, improving intelligence and international cooperation, and prioritizing preventive measures. The country prevents terrorism by promoting moderate Islam and enhancing community engagement (Ahmad & Dhillon, 2022).

In Malaysia, authorities historically attributed the threat of terrorism to the Communist Party of Malaya, which primarily carried out its activities through insurgency until the 1990s. In the late 1990s, a surge in militant Islamism emerged, notably with the establishment of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its affiliation with Al Qaeda. In response, the Malaysian government implemented the Internal Security Act (ISA) and Security Measures, effective from the 2000s to 2012, granting the government extensive powers to address security threats, including terrorism, without needing a trial. Nevertheless, due to the controversial nature of the ISA, the Malaysian government subsequently enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2015 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2015) and amended the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) in 2019.

Counterterrorism in Malaysia involves coordination among multiple agencies, including the National Security Council (NSC), the Malaysian Intelligence Agency, the Anti-Terrorism Police Division, and the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force. Chaired by the Prime Minister and consisting of representatives from various ministries, security, and intelligence agencies, the NSC plays a crucial role in coordinating and overseeing the response to terrorism. Although Malaysia does not have a specific terrorism warning system, the Police Anti-Terrorism Division is responsible for implementing appropriate security measures, responding to threats, assessing the threats, and disseminating information.

On the other side, the Philippines has been dealing with terrorism since the 1960s, mainly perpetrated by separatist groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). These groups seek autonomy or independence for the Muslim-majority region in the southern Philippines. In the 1990s, Islamic extremist groups, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), also began operating in the Philippines. These groups have ties to regional and international terrorist networks, including Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

As in Malaysia, the Philippines government addresses terrorism crises through collaboration among numerous agencies and stakeholders to respond effectively, prevent attacks, gather intelligence, and enforce security measures. This coordination involves the National Security Council, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippines National Police (PNP), the Intelligence Agency, and the Crisis Management Committee. The situational alert system is not specific to terrorism but focuses on general security issues. The Philippine National Police and Armed Forces determine the alert level based on the overall security situation and the presence of specific threats. The coordination and implementation of the situational alert system involve the PNP, AFP, and other security agencies. They monitor security situations, assess threats, and communicate alert levels to units and agencies regarding the necessary actions to address specific situations.

The situational alert systems in the four countries have developed and adjusted over time in response to the evolving security landscape and emerging threats. The variations in these systems in the US, UK, Malaysia, and the Philippines reflect each country's distinctive approaches and priorities in countering terrorism and ensuring public safety. Below is an overview of the strategies employed to analyze and address the terrorism crisis in these four countries.

Table 1. Strategy of the Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control in the US, UK, Malaysia and the Philippines

Country/ Countermeasures	United States	United Kingdom	Malaysia	The Philippines
Types of terrorism threats	Domestic & International	Domestic & International	Domestic & International	Domestic & International
Counterterrorism Policy	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crisis Control Agencies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crisis Control System	Coordinating among multiple	Coordinating among multiple	Coordinating among the	Coordinating among the

	agencies, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the control center.	agencies, with the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) as the control center.	Intelligence Agency, the Anti-Terrorism Police Division, and the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force, with the National Security Council as the coordinator.	National Security Council, the Armed Forces, the Police, the Intelligence Agency, and the Crisis Management Committee with alert level determined by the police and the armed forces.
Threat Level Analysis	✓ (HSAS until 2010 & NTAS)	✓ (CONTEST)	X	X

Source: US National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism 2017-2021; UK Contest 2003-2023; Ministry of Home Affairs of Malaysia, 2015; Department of Justice of the Philippines, 2020

Table 1 shows that all four countries grapple with domestic and international terrorism concerns. With the US being the exception, the other three countries, including Indonesia, are dealing with separatist groups, communist parties, and religious factions that pose significant terrorist threats from within. While the US doesn't face separatist or communist groups domestically, the US government must address extremist actions from right-wing and anti-government entities. Consequently, these countries have all developed tailored counterterrorism strategies to address their domestic challenges.

In response to the evolving threat of global and transnational terrorism, the US, UK, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia have also tailored their counterterrorism strategies to fit their respective governmental structures. While the US and UK governments have chosen a restrained approach through organizations like DHS and JTAC, Malaysia and the Philippines have opted for more coordination among various agencies, often entrusting the first responder for terrorism incidents to the national police or army, as seen in the Philippines.

Based on the above description, Malaysia and the Philippines need to enhance their dissemination of periodic analyses addressing potential terrorist threats and threat levels within their countries. This information is crucial for informed policymaking and ensuring the safety of citizens. Regular and continuous analyses published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the US and the Joint Terrorist Analysis Center (JTAC) in the UK play a crucial role in aiding the leaders of both countries to effectively control the crisis before, during, and after incidents due to terrorism. Their

analyses also provide early warnings to the public, enabling proactive measures to minimize potential losses and protect the safety of individuals in the event of a terrorist attack.

Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control in Indonesia

To understand Indonesian practices, this session discusses the challenges faced by BNPT in fulfilling its role as the Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control and, therefore, makes recommendations for improvement. Under Law No. 5 of 2018, specifically Article 43E, as the Center for terrorism analysis and Crisis Control or Pusdalsis, BNPT must effectively support the President in formulating policies and measures to address crises due to terrorism, including resource mobilization. As an analysis center, BNPT has published a series of documents explaining current threat conditions. These include the Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outlook (2023), Tracking the Impact of PCVE Civil Society Organizations in Indonesia (2023), and Analysis of Local Government Readiness to Implement the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (RAN-PE) Leading to Terrorism (2023). In addition, BNPT has compiled several indices, such as the Terrorism Vulnerability Index (IKT), Terrorism Risk Index (IRT), Radicalism Potential Index (IPR), and State Apparatus Readiness Index in Countering Terrorism (IKAP), which have been issued annually since 2020.

Nevertheless, BNPT has yet to provide regular and continuous analyses of the threat level and early warning system, akin to the US Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), US National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), and UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CONTEST). Furthermore, BNPT lacks insights into crisis stages and necessary steps from pre- to post-crisis. A significant hurdle BNPT faces in fulfilling its role is gathering information from relevant ministries and institutions, especially intelligence data (Johnson, 2016; Prasetyo, 2016; Sutriyono, 2023). The absence of a threat assessment and analysis of the terrorism crisis regularly will impede the government in presenting Indonesia's security situation concerning terrorism in national and international forums.

The suboptimal functioning of Pusdalsis stems from two primary issues: first, there are still challenges to coordination and communication among relevant stakeholders, including TNI and Polri, and second, there are no detailed regulations governing the

determination of threat levels and crisis management stages. To address these challenges, the Indonesian government can pursue three strategies. First, policymakers should draft laws that strengthen Pusdalsis' function in addressing actual and potential terrorist activities at local, national, and international levels. These regulations are essential to effective communication and coordination between BNPT and other relevant stakeholders, including TNI and the Police, under existing laws. Furthermore, the rules must provide a comprehensive framework for determining threat levels and crisis impact. The President can establish such a framework through a decree that regulates the roles of multiple ministries and institutions with relevant governmental authority.

Second, it is essential to ensure that all stakeholders understand the Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control's function. This shared understanding should be established by focusing on all stakeholders' essential responsibilities and functions, following relevant laws and regulations, considering academic research, and assessing evolving threat trends. Thirdly, it is imperative to foster a collective commitment between BNPT and all related stakeholders to enhance the function of BNPT as Pusdalsis.

The strategy to enhance the function of Pusdalsis BNPT must also carefully consider the socio-cultural context of Indonesian society. This socio-cultural context includes the nation's diversity, historical background, and awareness of the social, economic, and psychological factors contributing to radicalization. It also involves community engagement in preventing recruitment efforts and serving as the "eyes and ears" against terrorism, as well as ensuring the protection of individual rights during the investigation, arrest, and trial of suspected terrorists. To strengthen BNPT's role as a hub for terrorism analysis and crisis control, it is essential to develop regulations focusing on the following five points:

1. **Coordination of Data Collection and Information Analysis:** This involves intelligence monitoring terrorist group activities, tracking suspicious individual movements, and identifying emerging threats, including those from social media and online platforms. Relevant ministries, institutions, and local governments will gather data and information following their responsibilities and applicable regulations.
2. **Formulation of Recommendations to Determine the Threat Level:** This pivotal phase aims to translate the amassed and processed information into a comprehensive situation analysis or threat scale. Analysts will present the resulting analysis to

stakeholders, providing vital recommendations for the President to make strategic decisions in specific situations. They will also periodically disseminate the analysis to the broader community based on their needs.

3. **Coordination in Crisis Response:** This section delineates the framework for coordination and communication among the various agencies tasked with countering terrorism, including the police, State Intelligence Agency (BIN), TNI, local governments, fire departments, hospitals, and victim protection institutions in the event of a terrorist attack. Effective coordination is paramount, as BNPT must actively respond to terrorism-related emergencies while directing, coordinating, supervising, and evaluating crisis responses across various scales.
4. **Defining Crisis Stages and Impact Scale:** To effectively analyze and control terrorism crises, it's crucial to clearly define the crisis's stages and the corresponding actions needed. BNPT must analyze these stages to enable effective crisis management and control while maintaining coordination with relevant ministries, institutions, and local governments.
5. **International Cooperation:** This section underscores the global nature of terrorism and emphasizes the need for the BNPT Crisis Control Center to collaborate with other countries and international agencies for counterterrorism. As a Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control Center, BNPT's cooperation initiatives include exchanging intelligence information, conducting joint training, enhancing human resource capacity, and collaborating on cross-border counterterrorism operations.

Given the above explanations, it is evident that additional efforts are indispensable from all stakeholders to empower BNPT to effectively carry out its responsibilities as a Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control. While it is not required for BNPT to replicate the approaches taken by the governments of the US and UK, regular analysis of the potential and scale of the terrorism threat is essential for both the government and society. At some point, BNPT must decide which analyses it will submit exclusively to the President as the ultimate decision maker and which it will share with relevant stakeholders and the public.

Further, as the Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crises Control, BNPT should strengthen its commitment to effective communication and coordination, particularly in responding to terrorist incidents. While local police serve as the first responders during

an attack, BNPT coordinates all necessary actions to minimize the impact and number of victims. BNPT also monitors and evaluates the legal process for perpetrators and calculates compensation for any losses resulting from terrorist incidents.

Conclusion

Efforts to protect all Indonesians from the potential threat of terrorism necessitate strengthening the function of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) as a Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control or so-called *Pusat Analisis dan Pengendalian Krisis (Pusdalsis)*. BNPT's pivotal role as Pusdalsis involves analyzing terrorism threats and undertaking efforts to prevent, detect, control, and respond to terrorism-related crises. This role reflects the state's commitment to protecting all Indonesians, maintaining national security, and contributing to international peace and stability.

The evolving threats and challenges of terrorism compel BNPT, as Pusdalsis, to consistently be responsive, adaptive, proactive, and innovative in conducting terrorism analysis, supervision, and control. Preparedness and cross-sectoral and international cooperation are paramount for successfully addressing the threat of terrorism. All parties, including the government, society, and international actors, must collaborate to combat terrorism and uphold peace and stability in Indonesia and the world.

Essentially, to strengthen the function of BNPT as Pusdalsis, it is crucial to formulate policies and legal frameworks that draw from the successful experiences of other countries, such as the US and the UK. However, it is essential to note that the experiences of other countries should not be the only consideration for these countermeasures. BNPT must also consider the Indonesians' social, economic, cultural, and historical conditions as the basis for its role. The involvement of various segments of stakeholders and society in developing the legal framework will enrich perspectives and garner support for BNPT as a Center for Terrorism Analysis and Crisis Control in Indonesia.

Declaration

During the preparation of this work, the authors used Grammarly AI to write more efficiently and effectively, reduce grammar and spelling errors, and improve overall

writing quality. The authors also use Mendeley to organize citations. After using these tools/services, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and took full responsibility for the publication's content.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests:

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