



EVALUATING INDONESIA'S DISASTER DIPLOMACY PRACTICES UNDER THE JOKOWI ADMINISTRATION IN 2018

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Abstrak

Artikel ini mengevaluasi praktik diplomasi bencana Indonesia tahun 2018, di mana beberapa peristiwa bencana berturut-turut menyebabkan korban jiwa yang sangat besar dan kerusakan material. Di satu sisi, bantuan internasional merupakan salah satu variabel penting yang dapat berperan dalam mengurangi risiko bencana. Di sisi lain, bantuan internasional dianggap sebagai faktor yang dapat menurunkan legitimasi pemerintah dalam menangani bencana. Artikel ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus untuk memahami bencana dan kebijakan bantuan luar negeri serta implikasinya terhadap keamanan negara dan manusia. Artikel ini menemukan bahwa orientasi pemerintah Indonesia di era Presiden Jokowi dalam penanggulangan bencana cenderung pada kebijakan yang berwawasan ke dalam yang konservatif dimana prioritas pemerintah dalam aspek keamanan negara justru membahayakan aspek keamanan manusia (human security).

Kata Kunci: *bantuan internasional, diplomasi bencana, Indonesia, keamanan manusia, keamanan negara*

Abstract

This article evaluates Indonesia's disaster diplomacy practices in 2018, where several successive disaster events caused enormous casualties and material damage. On the one hand, international assistance is one of the important variables that can play a role in reducing the risk of disasters. On the other hand, international assistance is considered a factor that can reduce the legitimacy of the government in dealing with disasters. This article uses a qualitative method with a case study approach to understanding the disaster and foreign aid policies and their implications for state and human security. This article finds that the orientation of the Indonesian government in the President Jokowi era in managing disasters tends to be an inward-looking policy that is conservative in which the government's priority in the aspect of state security actually endangers the aspect of human security (human security).

Keywords: disaster diplomacy, human security, Indonesia, international aids, state security

Introduction

Indonesia, an archipelago country located in the Pacific's Ring of Fire is highly vulnerable to various types of disasters at low – to – high scales. Some disasters had occurred in the country include earthquake, tsunami, volcano eruption, and flooding. According to the degree of disaster vulnerability, Indonesia is ranked in the 33rd position based on the report on Disaster Risk Index the Year 2018.

Earthquake and Tsunami that occurred in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) on December 26th, 2004 was one of the most devastating disaster happened in Indonesia (Enia, 2008). It caused severe impacts with more than 130.000 deaths, 37.000 lost, more than 1.000 wounded, and 500.000 lost their homes. The tsunami impacted not only Indonesia, but also neighboring countries such as Thailand, India, and Srilanka. The massive impacts have attracted international responses very quickly to help the victims. One of the priority needs was how to get access to remote areas in the affected region. To fulfill this need, the Indonesian Government decided to invite international assistance for immediate action to rescue victims and mitigate any further casualties. On the day of December 30th, 2004 which was the 4th day after the tsunami, the spokesman of the Indonesia Foreign Ministry, Yuri Thamrin announced that international assistance was prioritized in transportation vehicles to mobilize and deliver goods and medical supplies to the most needed victims in NAD and North Sumatra province. In response to this Indonesia call, Malaysia immediately sent their 2 best airplanes, Australia provided 4 Hercules Helicopters, and Singapore delivered two helicopters (Pryor, 2006). According to BBC reports on January 27th, 2005 more than 29 countries had participated in providing international assistance to evacuate the victims and conducting rehabilitation/reconciliation through either governmental organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The assistance was given in the form of physical and/or non-physical aid (Wong et al., 2006).

The Indonesian Government had paid full attention to provide aid for the victims. This was manifested through the establishment of the Rehabilitation and Reconciliation Agency for Aceh and Nias which was meant to conduct any coordinative action with the international donors. This agency managed the whole aid fund from various sources including a national budget, foreign countries assistance, international red cross, local NGOs such as PKPU, BSMI as well as both national and international corporate from more than 900 institutions. The agency had received total aid funds of more than USD 7.2 billion (Mangkusubroto, 2012).

To respond to the disaster, the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, immediately called for an emergency meeting with his ministers and decided to conduct three-stage action, include: (i). the emergency response action to evacuate the victims, (ii). the mobilization and assignment of the army and police units for a short period of time, (iii). to ensure the military ceasefire between Indonesia and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) as well as inviting the GAM to help the victims. The President also called for a peaceful end of the conflict with GAM (Gunawan, 2014). Two years later, another heavy earthquake at 5.9 scales happened in Yogyakarta province on May 27th, 2006. It caused many casualties as many as 5.713 deaths, 38.123 injured in both provinces Yogyakarta and Central Java. In addition, more than 126.000 building were totally damaged, 183.399 building were heavily destroyed, and 259.816 building was slightly broken (Haifani, 2008).

The Indonesian Government under Yudhoyono's administration invited international assistance to assist the government to response the disaster's impact. It was reported that many international organizations had deployed their resources to assist rescue and recovery in the affected region. Those organizations belong to both GO and NGOs such as UNICEF, OXFAM, MED, UNOCHA, IFRC, Jesuit Refugee Services, Americas, USAID, Handicap International, Islamic Relief, and Mercy Relief Singapore (Haifani, 2008).

Another heavy earthquake at 6.4 magnitudes hit Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara on July 29th, 2018. This heavy earthquake was followed by more than 600 times earthquakes at lower magnitude during the subsequent month. According to Disaster Eradication National Agency (DENA), it caused more than 540 human deaths, thousand injured, thousand of houses ruined, as well as some mosques. Unfortunately, despite the earthquake caused severe impacts and casualties, the President of Indonesia Joko Widodo (Jokowi) did not declare it as a national disaster. Moreover, the President restricted any international assistance which aimed to help the victims (Farisa, 2018).

During the recovery of the affected region in Lombok, another earthquake with 7.4 magnitudes and followed by a tsunami hit Donggala and Palu, Central Sulawesi on September 29th, 2018. It also triggered a soil liquefaction phenomenon in densely populated areas of Sigi that caused heavy damages. DENA reported on 10 October 2018 that it caused the death of a large number of about 2,045 people, and that more than 82,000 people lost their homes. The earthquake and tsunami-ravaged many vital buildings such as hotels, hospitals, markets, BTS, airports, and

mosques that caused limited access to food and other basic needs. This condition caused riots and social instability where many people took over local supermarkets and food supplies to survive the disaster.

In this situation, the Jokowi administration still applied a similar policy to restrict international assistance to help the tsunami's victims. The status of a disaster, whether it is local or national, is one of the important aspects that could influence the way the government responds to the disasters. In addition, the Jokowi administration policy that tends to limit international assistance is another issue that needs to be examined. Regarding this, what are the implications from the limitation of international assistance for the security of the state and the human especially in the most affected region? Therefore, this paper aims to evaluate Indonesia's disaster policy under Jokowi's administration. It suggests that Indonesia should be more inclusive in their disaster diplomacy especially toward international assistance to ensure the adequate security of the people in the disaster's affected region.

Disaster Diplomacy

There is some existing research within the disaster diplomacy literature. It can be understood from two perspectives. First, the perspective called 'facilitative' in disaster diplomacy. This perspective emphasizes the inclusivity of the international actor's role to overcome disaster and its related issues. International assistance is considered as an important variable not confined to respond disasters and their related impacts but to improve the economy, politics, and security of the recipient countries.

According to Kelman (2012), three events of natural disasters such as the earthquake in Greece and Turkey, hurricane in Cuba and the US, and drought in Southern Africa suggested that natural disaster could significantly encourage diplomatic process relied on the existing basic agreement, although a sole disaster might not be able to create new diplomacy. Activities related to disaster might catalyze the process without creating any cooperation.

His study in Indonesia also shows similar results, that disasters can be managed to become an effective asset in managing the resolution of the separatist conflict in Aceh. The earthquake that was followed by a great tsunami made the level of socio-economic, cultural, and social damage severe. This condition creates a situation where continuing the conflict is an irrational choice. Kelman (2012) pointed out that the Indonesian government in persuading the political choices of

the Free Aceh Movement to promote comprehensive negotiations effectively managed the natural disasters in Aceh. Kelman's study is also reinforced by a study from Whittle (2015), which shows that natural disasters open up a large space for non-state actors from between countries in conflict to be able to interact with each other on behalf of humanity. The intensive interaction of non-state actors increases the position of socio-political relations with the state. As a result, non-state actors have a strategic position to push their respective governments to normalize political relations between countries (Whittle, 2015).

Majority of countries which experienced natural disaster had paved their way towards international assistance to help recovery and establish a mitigate framework in responding future disaster. Those countries had officially used international assistance to cover up 73% of the fatalities due to the disaster (Yang, 2008). According to (Strömberg, 2007) who conducted a study on disaster diplomacy in five continents i.e. Africa, Asia, America, Europe, and Oceania, two main factors that affecting international assistance: (i). The number of international assistance that is delivered immediately after the event is highly influenced by how often the disaster is reported through mass media or press. (ii). donor countries tend to deliver their assistance for a country that has strong political and diplomatic relations with them (Strömberg, 2007).

Second, a perspective called 'conservative' in disaster diplomacy. This perspective assumes that international assistance for responding to natural disasters is prone to create a domestic distortion than its benefits. It perceives that international assistance might endanger the legitimacy and authority of the government. Therefore, many countries tend to show a 'domestication' of natural disasters meaning that the disasters should be maintained as a local or domestic issue, and thus it should limit the role of the international community to assist. The government tends to hide the critical information of the disasters either from their people or the international community. This kind of government assumes that if the disaster and its impact are widely exposed, it may show the inability of the governments to respond to the problems. To some extent, international assistance may be considered as an instrument for donors to intervene and infiltrate into the recipients' state domestic interests and security.

Shakya's study of foreign aid in Nepal also shows an interesting point. Nepal's position as one of the poorest countries places it in such a way as to open up a large space for international assistance. Thirty-four countries offered assistance during the disaster, such as military teams from several countries, as well as financial aid commitments (Shakya, 2020). However, Nepal

refused assistance from Taiwan at China's insistence. The Chinese government emphasized that receiving assistance from Taiwan is perceived as a form of recognition and existence of Taiwan in the international system (New York Times, 2015).

Carnegie's study shows that several countries rejected international assistance due to several factors including perceptions of prestige or self-esteem and its relation to the country's capacity to tackle these problems as well as domestic political dynamics such as the variable of public trust in the government (Carnegie, 2017). The choice to refuse international aid due to prestige, for example, has been made by several large countries such as Japan in 1995 regarding the disaster in Kobe, the United States in 2005 related to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, and India related to the Tsunami disaster in 2004. The governments that refused aid perceive themselves as having sufficient capacity to manage disaster nationally. International assistance is considered able to cause domestic security problems in the country (Dany, 2020).

A study from Howe & Stites (2019) shows that there is a tendency for countries experiencing disasters to have a high distrust of anyone who wants to assist, especially if the problem is related to political security issues such as conflict, separatism, and rebellion. Therefore, they emphasize the need for trust and assurance that international aid activities do not intervene and provide political support in matters of domestic political security in aid recipient countries (Howe & Stites, 2019).

Research Method

This study is qualitative research with a case study approach. Data sources were obtained from several disaster policy documents from the Acts to government policies, and the recent information such as president, ministers, governor, head of BNPB and BPBD, non-governmental organizations statement from online media regarding this research topic. The Indonesian government's operational policy documents were obtained from several statements by officials with authority in disasters such as the president, relevant ministers, and heads of BNPB in responding to international assistance in times of disasters. The analysis focuses on policy options for managing foreign assistance. This data will be analyzed using a conceptual framework of conservative policies and facilitative policies in disaster management, especially concerning foreign assistance. In this regard, the analysis will continue by looking at the impact of this policy on the quality of state security and human security in Indonesia.

Indonesia's Disaster Diplomacy Management

Jokowi's administration tends to restrict international assistance which may go through across the affected areas with regards to the management of earthquake recovery in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara as well as a disaster in Palu and Donggala, Central Sulawesi (Farisa, 2018). This policy is relatively different with the former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in addressing the disasters in NAD and Yogyakarta (Rizki Gunawan, 2014; Haifani, 2008).

Sutopo Purwo Nugroho, as a Chief of the Center of Information Database and Public Relation of DENA, emphasized that Indonesia could accommodate international assistance through the official mechanisms and procedures. However, unfortunately, despite President had announced to welcome any form of international aid, it was reported that the assistance was still restricted (Kuwado, 2018).

According to the regulation of chairman of DENA No. 22 The Year 2010 about Participation of International Agency and NGOs during the stage of Emergency Response, an international institution is allowed to go through and deliver aid to Indonesia, according to the President's statement on this matter. Yet, the officers of DENA and the National Agency of SAR forcefully prohibited foreign helpers to conduct any action for evacuating or recovering the victims. Besides, the government had also withheld foreign aid which already went through in Lombok, and prevented it to be delivered to the victims. The aid was originally sent from international agencies or NGOs which had cooperation with local NGOs in Lombok (Rahadi, 2018).

Meanwhile, President Joko Widodo had instructed the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security, Wiranto to carry out coordination with Social Ministry, DENA, Army, and Police to overcome the disaster without international assistance (Aminah, 2018; Rahadi, 2018; Yossihara, 2018). President Joko Widodo had made a promise to the victims that they would be granted a 50 million Rupiah for each heavily damaged house and life insurance assistance for every person during his visit to the affected areas in Lombok on July 30th, 2018. However, having waited for two months, that grant and assistance had never come up to the people. Therefore, they marched to local government for seeking justice to get their rights and President's promises due to lack of their basic needs supplies such as foods and clothes as well as a place to stay. They lived in an

emergency tent which was prone to flooding especially during the rainy season (Hernawadi & Djafar, 2018; Nursyamsi, 2018).

On September 29th, 2018 which was a day after the earthquake and tsunami hit Donggala and Palu, President Joko Widodo instructed Wiranto to evacuate the victims and overcome any impacts of the disasters in coordination with DENA and the Army (Jordan, 2018). When international communities knew its severe impacts and massive fatality on human deaths and ruined infrastructures, they immediately sent their condolences and preparing aid. On October 1st, 2018, British Government announced to deliver aids for the victims. Penny Mordaunt, a Member of Parliament (MP) stated that London had received a call for help and willing to dispatch a professional team. In addition, she has raised a fund for a total of 2 million Pounds to supply basic needs for the victims (Utomo, 2018). It was also reported that the Indian Prime Minister had directly contacted President Joko Widodo and promised to provide funds as many as USD 1 million to help to recover infrastructures especially the houses. With regards to the massive offer of international assistance, the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani said that she would determine the official mechanisms and procedures for international aid delivery (Setiawan, 2018).

On October 1st, 2018, Wiranto stated that President had decided to welcome aid from the international community. It was noted that there were 18 countries ready to send their aid including the US, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Norway, Hungary, Turkey, European Union, Australia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, India, and China. Some other neighboring countries were also willing to provide transporting aircraft for humanitarian aid. Indonesia's government had deployed immigration support for foreign volunteers who would pass through Balikpapan. Chief of the Center of Information Database and Public Relation of DENA emphasized that Indonesia did not call for help from the international community, but the international assistance is allowed to go through the affected areas because Indonesia respected the help from the international actors (Yasa, 2018).

However, on October 7th, 2018, the Antara news agency reported that there was a ban by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia to international NGOs that was prohibited to deliver any forms of aid directly to the victims in the affected areas. This ban had affected negatively the delivery of aid that consequently makes the condition of the victim even worse. This regulation was then clarified by the spokesman of Foreign Minister, Arrmanatha Nasir, to ensure that foreign volunteers should carry out coordinative action with related agencies in Indonesia which was in

charge to lead the evacuation and rehabilitation. Some foreign volunteers were ordered to leave Palu because of the absence of an official permit and have not performed coordination with the authoritative agencies (Setiawan, 2018).

Responses and recoveries from the Central Government and the local Government of Central Sulawesi were very slow to evacuate the victims and to mitigate further impacts (e.g. starvation) as well as minimum access of foreign volunteers to deliver their help (Kami & Zhacky, 2018). Kompas reported that on Sunday, September 30th, 2018 a massive looting and robbery of foods in local supermarkets and traditional markets in almost every place in Donggala and Palu. In addition, a limited number of public kitchens to provide food for the survivors could not meet the demands. This situation implies that the huge concern of the government on state sovereignty while tending to neglect the security of the people suggests many negative impacts in managing and responding to disasters.

On December 22nd, 2018, another tsunami, caused by the eruption of Anak Krakatoa, hit major beaches located in surrounding areas of Sunda Straits, the provinces of Banten and Lampung. According to DENA, the number of casualties until the 4th day reached around 430 deaths, 159 missing, and many damaged houses. In response to the disaster, the international community stated their condolences and offered disaster assistance such as from the President of China, Russia, and South Korea, the Prime Minister of Australia, and Japan. However, according to Sutopo, the President of Indonesia has not yet announced any official statement to call for international assistance until December 26th, 2018. The Indonesian Government believed that they have adequate capacity and resources to deal with the impacts (FHR, 2018).

Protection Against Foreign Assistance

The Jokowi government's choice to refuse several foreign assistance related to disaster issues cannot be separated from several factors. Firstly, Indonesia's superstructure and regulations do not provide sufficient space for the involvement of international actors in disaster management, especially during emergency response. This issue can be reflected in several disaster regulations in Indonesia, such as Act No. 24/2007 on Disaster Mitigation, Government Regulation no. 21/2008 on the Implementation of Disaster Mitigation, Government Regulation no. 22/2008 on Funding and Disaster Aid Management, Government Regulation no. 23/2008 on the Involvement of International Organizations and Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on the

Disaster Mitigation, Presidential Regulation no. 8/2008 on National Agency for Disaster Mitigation, and The Head of BNPB Regulation no. 7/2012.

The Indonesian regulation does not necessarily accommodate the disaster diplomacy concept, a concept that is already widely accepted by many countries (Surwandono & Herningtyas, 2017). The last updated version of disaster regulation in Indonesia was made after 2004. In contrast, Ilan Kelman argued that Indonesia's policy and experience in dealing with conflict reconciliation is a good practice of disaster diplomacy (Kelman, 2012).

The flexible nature of the disaster diplomacy concept had given a limitation to international actors in their involvement in managing disaster issues, of the 6 regulations mentioned above, there was 87% national involvement and only some 13% of those international. From 13% international actors, around 7% from United Nations organizations, while the rest came from INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations), IGO (International Governmental Organizations), and International society. It suggests that international assistance for responding to natural disasters is still very limited in the context of, meaning that disaster diplomacy in Indonesia remains inward-looking oriented (Surwandono, Herningtyas, Ratih, 2018).

Participation of international agencies in disaster management in Indonesia is regulated in Act No. 24 the Year 2007, particularly mentioned in article 30. It is stated that international agencies/institutions may conduct disaster management and action either individually or cooperatively with local partners. In addition, the Indonesian Government ensures protective insurances toward their workers/volunteers. This article is further elaborated in Government Regulation No. 23 the Year 2008 which mentions that international agencies shall get approval and work under the coordination of DENA, including cash funding aid. It is also stated that DENA must conduct official consultation with Foreign Minister to address this funding aid (Surwandono & Herningtyas, 2017).

Secondly, the Indonesian government claims to have sufficient capacity to manage several disasters. Even in the context of disasters that occurred simultaneously in several different areas, Disaster in 2018 showed several disasters occurring simultaneously in Lombok, Palu, and Pangandaran. The Indonesian government has made it clear that Indonesia does not need international assistance. The statement was more frequently uttered by the ministry of law and security rather than by the ministry of social affairs, ministries of housing, and ministries of health. Based on the aforementioned evaluative explanation, many public figures announced official

statements as representative of the Indonesian Government related to the two last heavy disasters, including the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security; Minister of Maritime; as well as Chairman of Dena (Jordan, 2018).

Implications for Human Security

The next question that needs to be answered is on how the implications of Indonesia's disaster policy in protecting the citizens in disaster areas. This is where the evaluation point will be developed. If the narration developed by the government to reject international aid related to disasters is linked to possible distortions of politics, economy, and sovereignty, is this option productive enough in protecting citizens in Indonesia?

International assistance in the context of disasters can be classified into two major stages: (i) at the time of a disaster, which consists of rescuing and evacuating the disaster victims, to opening access to areas affected by the disaster. In a number of disaster studies, international teams that have the capacity in the context of survival are commonly military teams and medical teams with special expertise. (ii). at the time after a disaster, which includes assistance activities related to, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and mitigation.

First, there is an important aspect in the context of an emergency for victims who are trapped in a disaster situation so that they can be saved, namely evacuation. In the context of disasters in Indonesia, the problem of evacuating disaster victims is one of the most critical issues. Both in terms of the technology to evacuate victims buried from collapsed buildings (BBCIndonesia.com, 2018) and the number of resources needed to evacuate victims (Kompas, 2018). The slow pace of the evacuation process will cause a lower survival probability of the victims trapped in the rubble. In the case of an earthquake in Nepal, international assistance in charge of evacuating a number of victims has contributed positively in reducing the number of deaths due to natural disasters (Paul et al., 2017).

The second critical aspect is related to human security, namely the availability of basic needs during the disaster response period. In a number of disasters that occurred in Indonesia in 2018, there were a number of classic problems that always arise, namely the occurrence of looting (BBC.com, 2018) and the lack of availability of basic needs (CNNIndonesia.com, 2018). International assistance in the emergency response period is crucial to mobilize the availability of

basic needs so that disaster victims will get adequate basic needs services. In the case of the disaster in Haiti, international involvement plays an important role in providing services to provide basic needs amidst the slow ability of the Haitian government to distribute aid (Lusk & Andre, 2017).

The third critical aspect is related to post-disasters response including reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructures and housings. Reflecting on disaster response in Aceh and Yogyakarta, the role of international donors such as Java Reconstruction Funds (World Bank, 2011), Islamic Relief (IR) (Reliefweb, 2020), and International Organization on Migration (IOM, 2006) were very critical in the reconstruction processes. Unfortunately, there was no donor association that has been created in the reconstruction processes in disasters that happened in Lombok and Palu. Consequently, the reconstruction of housings became very slow (CNNIndonesia.com, 2018). It caused a series of protests from the survivors (Hernawadi & Djafar, 2018).

The fourth critical aspect is related to the human development index. The data showed that the affected region in Lombok and Palu have a decreased quality of human development index (Infopublk.id, 2019). Meanwhile, Yogyakarta, in the aftermath of the earthquake in 2006, has a relatively quick economic recovery. The synergy between national and international actors contributes significantly to the process of recovery and reconstruction (Andriansyah, 2015).

Conclusion and Suggestions

There are some definite concerns in making Indonesia disaster diplomacy to be outward-looking since it would raise the issue of state security in the frame of sovereignty context, i.e. fears of infiltration, espionage, and intervention. From some disaster experiences, we have learned a lot that the most critical disaster problem lies at the emergency response stage, meaning that the authorities must be able to immediately take action after a disaster occurs. This is the most critical situation to provide a sense of security to the community so that they can survive disasters and the various negative impacts they cause. From some disaster experiences, we have learned a lot that the most critical disaster problem lies at the emergency response stage, meaning that the authorities must be able to immediately take action after a disaster occurs.

This is the most critical situation to provide a sense of security to the community so that they can survive disasters and the various negative impacts they cause. Therefore, it is critically

necessary for Indonesia to provide more spaces for international participation in the disaster relief processes through re-observing some regulations and practical mechanisms concerning disaster relief. Indonesia should be more inclusive of international assistance in its disaster diplomacy.

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